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5 October 1962

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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USSR: (Moscow's reaction to Secretary McNamara's 28 September press conference reflects Soviet sensitivity to assertions of the West's readiness to use force to maintain its position in Berlin and to the possibility that West Germany may acquire a nuclear capability.)

(Polyanov, Izvestia's authoritative commentator on Berlin and German affairs, asserted in a 3 October article that Western "saber-rattling" will make no impression on the USSR. He renewed previous warnings that any "showdown" over West Berlin could escalate into a general nuclear conflict.)

(Izvestia reaffirmed Moscow's preference for a negotiated settlement but warned that there is a "time limit" to Soviet patience.)

(The Soviet press has claimed that Secretary McNamara's recent trip to West Germany provided further evidence that the "West German brass virtually already have atomic bombs.")

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***USSR-Yugoslavia:** The Soviet-Yugoslav communiqué of 3 October indicates that Belgrade and Moscow are firmly resolved, as they were in 1955, to let bygones be bygones and to develop closer cooperation in economic, cultural, and foreign affairs.

The communiqué detailed broad areas of agreement in foreign policy, particularly on disarmament and nuclear testing. Both sides recognized the need "to sign a German peace treaty and to normalize the situation in West Berlin," but no reference was made to a separate East German treaty.

Moscow endorsed last July's Cairo Economic Conference of Developing States. This conference, originated by Yugoslavia, called for an international trade conference under UN auspices. Moscow's endorsement in effect recognizes Yugoslavia's leading role among the neutrals and identifies the USSR with their aspirations.

The communiqué placed particular stress on increased economic cooperation between the two countries, apparently assuring future Soviet loans and permission for Yugoslavia to participate in some committees of the bloc's economic organization (CEMA). The document did not mention party relations but hinted, by advocating "co-operation between public and other organizations," that party questions will be further pursued.

The communiqué's endorsement of the June 1955 Tito-Khrushchev declaration will provide another source of disagreement in the bloc. The 1955 declaration in effect legitimized Yugoslavia's unique "road to socialism."

The Yugoslav official news agency said an invitation for Tito to spend a "holiday" in the USSR as Khrushchev's guest had been renewed and Tito "is expected to visit" the Soviet Union "this year."

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Yugoslavia-Albania: (Yugoslavia may be planning to subvert the Albanian regime of Enver Hoxha. Such a plan may have Moscow's blessing.)

(On 30 September, Dusan Mugosa, party chief in Yugoslavia's Albanian minority region, warned publicly that Communist rule in Albania was threatened by the Hoxha-Shehu leadership. In his speech he asserted that even Albanian politburo members lacked confidence in the two men. The speech was featured by Borba, one of Belgrade's leading dailies.)

(Moscow's acquiescence is suggested by the timing of Mugosa's speech during Soviet President Brezhnev's visit to Yugoslavia and the fact that Mugosa visited Moscow last July.)

(As early as last winter the Yugoslav secret police were reportedly laying the groundwork for forming a new Albanian refugee organization. It was to be composed of educated Albanian refugees and former Albanian party members, men who apparently could serve as the nucleus of a new Albanian government.)

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Venezuela: Terrorist activities in and around Caracas have risen sharply.

Several military and police personnel have been murdered and others threatened with death in what may be part of a leftist campaign to provoke a military coup against President Betancourt's government. Several high-ranking officers, dissatisfied with the government's inability to control the extremists, reportedly have planned to overthrow Betancourt if the terrorism is not stopped.

According to the US Embassy, the present uneasiness will probably be compounded now that the violence-prone Central University has reopened and the Congress--with the lower house controlled by the opposition--has reconvened.

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*France: The toppling of the Pompidou cabinet early today by a censure vote in the National Assembly will not diminish popular support for De Gaulle in the 28 October referendum on his proposal for election of the next French President by universal suffrage.

De Gaulle's handling of this proposal--specifically his bypassing of parliament in scheduling the referendum--was the immediate issue which led to the censure vote.

It is generally anticipated that the National Assembly will now be dissolved.

Both opponents and supporters of De Gaulle will portray today's vote as a victory. Gaullists will argue that De Gaulle finally succeeded in goading the deputies into opening the way for new elections; they are confident they can profit at the polls from public backing for De Gaulle's plan for election of his successor. The other parties will proclaim that a stand has been made for republican liberties; but their inability to agree on a counterproposal to De Gaulle's referendum scheme shows the difficulties they face in trying to form a united front to defeat Gaullist candidates.

De Gaulle may decide against dissolving the present assembly and instead simply appoint a new premier. New elections would restrict his maneuverability somewhat, since under the constitution a new assembly could not be dissolved for at least a year. [redacted]

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